In an article on Hintikka's Knowledge and Belief, I suggested that certain difficult questions come to mind when we consider the thought that an individual in one possible world might be identical with an individual in another possible world.2 The present paper is written in response to the editor's invitation to be more explicit about these questions.
Let us suppose, then, that the figure of an infinity of possible worlds makes good sense and let us also suppose, for simplicity of presentation, that we have a complete description of this one. We may consider some one of the entities of this world, alter its description slightly. adjust the descriptions of the other entities in the world to fit this alteration, and then ask ourselves whether the entity in the possible world that we thus arrive at is identical with the entity we started with in this world. We start with Adam, say; we alter his description slightly and allow him to live for 931 years instead of for only 930; we then accomodate our descriptions of the other entities of the world to fit this possibility (Eve, for example, will now have the property of being married to a man who lives for 931 years instead of that of being married to a man who lives for only 930); and we thus arrive at a description of another possible world. able to assume that Adam retains his identity through the relatively slight changes involved in the transition from W1 to W2, and so, too, for Noah, then it would also seem reasonable to assume that each retains his identity through the equally slight changes involved in all the other transitions that took us finally to Wn. (These transitions, of course, may be as gradual as one pleases. Instead of it being a year that we take away from Noah in our first step and give to Adam, it could be only a day, or a fraction of a second.) But identity is transitive. And therefore, one might argue, once we allow Adam to exist in more than one possible world, we commit ourselves to affirmative answers to the puzzling questions we have encountered.
Is there a way, then, in which we might reasonably countenance identity through possible worlds and yet avoid such extreme conclusions? The only way, so far as I can see, is to appeal to some version of the doctrine that individual things have essential properties. One possibility would be this:
For every entity x, there are certain properties N and certain properties E such that: x has N in some possible worlds and x has non-N in others; but x has E in every possible world in which x exists; and, moreover, for every y, if y has E in any possible world, then y is identical with x. (If "being identical with x7 refers to a property of x, then we should add that E includes certain properties other than that of being identical with x.) The properties E will thus be essential to x and the properties N twn-essential, or accidental."
To avoid misunderstanding, we should contrast this present use of "essential property" with two others.
(1) Sometimes the "essential properties" of a thing are said to be just those properties that the thing has necessarily. But it is not implausible to say that there are certain properties which are such that everything has those properties necessarily; the properties, for example, of being either red or non-red, of being colored if red, and of being self-identical.6 Thus the Eiffel Tower 6 We could put the doctrine more cautiously by saying that the distinction between the two types of property holds, not for every entity x, but only for some entities x. But what reason could there be for thinking that it holds of some entities and not of others?
' Sometimes these properties are called "analytic properties" or 'tautological properties"; but the property of being colored if red should not be socalled if, as some have argued, "Everything that is red is colored" is not analytic.
is necessarily red or non-red, necessarily colored if red, and necessarily self-identical; and so is everything else.7
(2) And sometimes it is said (most unfortunately, it seems to me) that each individual thing is such that it has certain properties which are essential or necessary to it "under certain descriptions of it" and which are not essential or necessary to it "under certain other descriptions of it." Thus "under one of his descriptions," the property of being President is said to be essential to Mr. Johnson whereas "under that description" the property of being the husband of Lady Bird is not; and "under another one of his descriptions," it is the other way around. Presumably every property P of every individual thing x is such that, "under some description of x," P is essential or necessary to x.
But if E is the set of properties that are essential to a given thing x, in the sense of "essential' that we have defined above, then: E will not be a universal property (indeed, nothing but x will have E); some of the properties of x will not be included in E; and E will not be such that there are descriptions of x "under which" E is not, in the sense defined, essential to x.
If I From the proposition that the Eiffel Tower is red and necessarily colored if red, it would be fallacious to infer that the Eiffel Tower is necessarily colored; this is the fallacy of inferring necessitate consequentis from necessitate consequentiae. And from the proposition that the Eiffel Tower is necessarily red or non-red, it would be fallacious to infer that the proposition that the Eiffel Tower is red or non-red is a necessary proposition; the proposition could hardly be necessary, for it implies the contingent proposition that there is an Eiffel Tower. This latter fallacy might be called the fallacy of inferring necessitate de dicto from necessitate de re. It is assumed, in many writings on modal logic, that 'Necessarily, for every x, x is identical with x" implies "For every x, necessarily x is identical with x," and therefore also "For every x and y, if x is identical with y, then necessarily x is identical with y." But is the assumption reasonable? It leads us to perplexing conclusions: for example, to the conclusion that every entity exists in every possible world and therefore, presumably, that everything is an ens necessarium.
It seems to me that even if
Why assume that necessarily the evening star is identical with the evening star? We should remind ourselves that "The evening star is identical with the evening star" is not a logical truth, for it implies the contingent proposition "There is an evening star," and that its negation is not "The evening star is diverse from the evening star." Wouldn't it be simpler to deny that "Necessarily, for every x, x is identical with x" implies "For every x, necessarily x is identical with x"? Then we could deny the principle de dicto, "Necessarily the evening star is identical with the evening star," and also deny the principle, de re, "The evening star is necessarily identical with the evening star."0L We could still do justice to the necessity that is here involved, it seems to me, provided we continued to affirm such principles, de dicto, as "Necessarily, for every x, x is identical with x" and "Necessarily, for every x and y, if x is identical with y then y is identical with x," and such principles, de re, "The evening star, like everything else, is necessarily self-identical." If we deny that "Necessarily, for every x, x is F" implies "For every x, necessarily x is F," then presumably we should also deny that "It is possible that there exists an x such that x is F" implies "There exists an x such that it is possible that x is F." But isn't this what we should do? One could hold quite consistently, it seems to me, that though it is possible that there exists something having the properties that Christians attribute to God, yet nothing that does exist is such that it is possible that that thing has the properties that Christians attribute to God.
